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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

A.

This appeal arises from two separate lawsuits ﬁled by the Respondents

Radford

Cattle,

LLC. The

was ﬁled

against

Van Orden

is

against Appellant Jay

Van

Orden. The Second

third party.

The lawsuit

based on disputes arising from ownership of real property and damage

caused t0 real property by

Code

was ﬁled

against Appellant Seven J Ranches, Inc. (hereinafter “Seven J”).

lawsuit

from a

ﬁrst lawsuit

Mark Radford and

Van Orden before

The lawsuit

it

was purchased by Respondent Mark Radford

against Seven J arises

from a fencing dispute based 0n Idaho

section 35-103.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

B.

Respondents ﬁled separate lawsuits against Van Orden and Seven J in Bingham County
Idaho. These cases were consolidated

October
1940.

19, 2020.

The cases were

all

by an Order Granting Motion
consolidated into

The Second Amended Complaint

that

separate causes 0f action. R. pp. 103-122.

one cause 0f action pursuant

Summary Judgment

Bingham County Case N0. CV-2017-

Respondents ﬁled against Van Orden contained ten

The Complaint ﬁled

trial

against Seven J contained only

court to determine they had standing. R. p. 63-75. That

motion was opposed and Appellant Van Orden argued
bring their property

that

Respondents did not have standing

damage claim because Respondents did not own

was damaged by Van Orden. R.

p.

63-75, Tr. pp. 20-30.

the subj ect property

The Court held

Summary Judgment Regarding

Part Plaintiffs’

Motion

that Plaintiff s

had standing because the prior property owner’s assigned

Appellant’s Brief - Page 1

for

0n

Idaho Code section 35-103. Respondents ﬁled a Motion for

t0

asking the

t0 Consolidate entered

in the

to

When

it

Order Granting in

Trespass entered 0n April 15, 2019,
their claim against

Van

Orden

to the Respondents.1

on April 30, 2019. That
pp. 326-380.

Orden

to

after the

The Court

The lawsuits were

trial

resulted in the Court’s Findings 0f Fact

and Conclusions 0f Law. R.

also entered a Judgment. R. pp. 381-383.The

pay respondents $72,175.00 based 0n damage

damage

occurred.

Judge Simpson starting

tried as a court trial before

The damage was a

cut

expand a road. The Judgment also required Seven

to property

made by
J t0

Judgment required Van

purchased by Respondents

a bulldozer in the side 0f a

pay Respondents $5,000

hill t0

for a fence that

Respondents constructed.

The Respondents then requested an award of costs and attorney
pertains t0 the clams against

and $1,220.72

Seven

in costs against

Which was granted

The

J.

Seven

J.

trial

C.

2,

R. p. 462. Appellants also ﬁled a motion t0 reconsider,

in part but denied as t0 all issues raised in this appeal. R. pp. 427-463.

2019. R.

p.

Amended Notice of Appeal on

405 and 422.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Damage to the Radford Property occurred before Radford purchased
and When the property was owned by the Thompsons
This appeal involves several different parcels of property that are

parties in areas

329.

0f Bingham County known as

Home Basin and Outlet Ridge

or leases property in the

The Order Granting

Homer Basin and

in

in Part Plaintiffs’

Clerk’s record 0n appeal even though

it

Homer Basin. Seven J owns
Motion

for

owned

the property

0r leased

by the

Outlet Ridge pastures.2 R. p.

Respondent Mark Radford owns

are adjacent to each other.

Homer Basin pasture. Jay Van Orden

Department of Lands (“IDL”)
l

it

court awarded Respondents $29,1 15.25 in fees

Appellants ﬁled a Notice of Appeal on August 30, 2019, and an

December

fees but only as

leases property

from the Idaho

real property that is located in the

Summary Judgment Regarding

Trespass was not included in the

contains ﬁndings 0f fact and conclusions 0f law.

A motion to augment the

record With this Order will be ﬁled s0 that the Order Will be included in the record 0n appeal.
2

Homer Basin and

Outlet Ridge are referred t0 as units, areas and pastures throughout the

trial

and

in the exhibits.

Regardless of how they are designated, they refer to the same property on the maps that are exhibits in this case.
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Mark Radford. This

Outlet Ridge pasture as does

Which

is

map

a

that identiﬁes

P Exs.

in question.

Homer Basin,

is

best illustrated

by

Plaintiff” s Exhibit 57,

Outlet Ridge and the ownership 0f the real property

p. 98.

A portion of Exhibit 57 is included below. Homer Basin is outlined in dark blue as
demonstrated by the key in the upper right corner. Outlet Ridge
property

owned by the Respondents

outlined in green.

the property with the color yellow

is

owned by Seven

Radford.” The property

is

J is a light pink color

and

is

and

marked

is

The

marked

“M

as “7-J Ranches.”

Exs. p. 98.
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Respondent Mark Radford purchased the property

Thompson

in yellow

on Exhibit 57 from Shirley

in January 2017. Tr. p. 117: 12-15; 209:4-9. Prior to closing

property, Radford signed a Real Estate Purchase and Sale

209: 10-210210; D. Exs. p. 108-1 14.

As

0n the

Agreement on

part of the Purchase

sale

May 23,

0f the subject
2016. Tr.

p.

and Sale Agreement, Radford

elected t0 inspect the property and give written notice t0 the seller of items that needed

correcting and the seller

would have an opportunity to make

at 109. Additionally, the

Purchase and Sale Agreement

condition 0f the

states:

“BUYER’S

PROPERTY is a contingency 0f this Agreement.” D.

Mark Radford testiﬁed
that

the corrections. D. Exs. p. 108-1 14

at trial that

acceptance 0f the

Exs. p. 108-1 14 at 109.

he read these portions 0f the Purchase and Sale Agreement,

he chose t0 inspect the property, and that he never informed the

seller

0f any deﬁciencies

With the property that needed t0 be corrected before closing in January 2017. Tr. pp. 21 1:4213: 14. Radford claims he inspected the property in June 2016 and then never went back t0 the

property before closing on the property in January 2017. Tr. pp. 212224-2139. The Purchase and
Sale

Agreement

states that if the

time period speciﬁed, the buyer

buyer does not give written notice of cancellation within the
is

deemed conclusively to have

elected to proceed With the

transaction Without repairs. Tr. pp. 216: 12-2 1 7:20. Radford testiﬁed that

Van Orden

road on the property he purchased from the Thompsons but that he does not

was excavated by Van Orden.
The purchase

Van Orden,

the

Tr. pp. 21

1 :2 1

price for the property

the record that the

to

pay

Thompsons

road

-2 1 2: 13.

less

money from the

t0 repair the road. Tr. pp. 218:

suffered any

1

sale

because of the road, and the

8-219: 12. There

is

n0 evidence

damages because 0f Van Orden’s conduct. At

the Respondents did not offer any evidence that the

Appellant’s Brief - Page 4

know When the

was not decreased because 0f the road improved by

Thompsons did not receive

Thompsons did not have

excavated a

Thompsons had assigned any claims

in

trial,

against

Van Orden to
part of a

them. The Trial Court relied on the Assignment 0f Claims that was submitted as

summary judgment motion to hold

the estate of Ted

Thompson had

against Jay

that Shirley

Van

Thomson had

Orden. R.

assigned

claims she or

all

The Assignment was

p. 9; R. p. 85.

signed on October 25, 2017.

Jay

Van Orden

did grade an existing road on the

Thompson property before

it

was sold

Radford. Tr. pp. 77124-77222; 78423-15. The Thompsons leased part of the property to Jay

Orden from the mid-199OS
there

was n0 agreement

until 2015. Tr. pp. 383:8—384:18; 38523-16; 41328-414218.

Van Orden

t0 continue leasing the property t0

in

2016,

never told that the lease was terminated or would not continue in 2016 as
19905. Tr. pp. 415:1 1-416: 16; 78226-78328. Because he thought he

from the Thompsons, Van Orden was working 0n fencing
bulldozer 0n the property that was then

improvement
particular,

t0 the

road that

is

Whitehead

Although,

Van Orden was

always had since the

still

leasing the property

summer 0f 2016 With
is

his

when he made

the

the basis of this lawsuit. Tr. pp. 768: 1-21; 771 24-773222. In

Homer Basin and Outlet Ridge pastures

fence. Tr. pp. 765:3-25.

The Whitehead fence crosses

over a narrow portion of Radford’s property between lands

is

Van

it

owned by the Thompsons and that

he was working on a fence between

referred t0 as the

in the

was

to

that is

east t0 west

owned by IDL. The Whitehead

fence

identiﬁed by a black line in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 100 which can be compared with Plaintiffs’

Exhibit llto see the location of the Whitehead fence.
part of a hill to

the

expand an existing road

in the

Whitehead fence which he had been doing

78027; 78413-15.
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Van Orden used his

summer 0f 2016

bulldozer to cut out

in order t0 facilitate his

work 0n

for years. Tr. pp. 768:1-21; 771 :4-773z22; 778: 17-

Respondent’s Expert was not reasonably certain about

The Respondents

called an expert at

trial,

Naylor conﬁrms

P Exs.

p.

that the cut

was admitted

made by Radford

30 and 3 1. Naylor testiﬁed

itself states

based 0n extensive design.” P EXS.
does not represent a bid. Tr.

p.

B

t0 the

0n the cost

Naylor report
is

You

is

were “preliminary”

entitled “Preliminary

a preliminary opinion only and

Cost

not

report states and Naylor testiﬁed that his report

He

testiﬁed that his opinions were not “reasonably

495:1 1-22.

more

detailed process necessary t0

precise assessment 0f cost and activities. Tr. p. 495:

Q.

t0 repair

The

certain” because he did not g0 through the

more

Mr.

led t0 and from an existing “4-Wheel-drive road.”

“The following

p. 42.

bulldozer to their

as Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 22. In that report,

that his opinions

opinions. Tr. p. 476:5-17. In fact Attachment

Opinion” and the opinion

Patrick Naylor, t0 offer his preliminary

Van Orden made With his

opinions on the cost to return the improvements
natural state. Mr. Naylor’s report

his opinions

1

1—22.

come up with

a

Naylor was speciﬁcally asked:

indicate that this opinion does not represent a bid.

A. Yes.

Q.

What d0 you mean by that?

A.

A bid would require a detailed design in order t0 have a more precise

assessment of cost and

Q. So

if

activities.

one were t0 develop a reasonably certain amount, that would be a

bid?
A. Yes.

Q.

And yours is

A. That

not reasonably certain because

it's

not a bid, correct?

is correct.

Tr. p. 495:1 1-22.

The Defense moved

t0 strike

Mr. Naylor’s testimony because his opinions were

not offered to a reasonable degree 0f certainty. Tr. pp. 495:23-49827. The motion was taken

under advisement and Mr. Naylor continued t0

testify.

Naylor testiﬁed

that Defendants’ Exhibit

30 was another estimate prepared by his ofﬁce for the same work and established an estimate
repair the

damage with a range 0f $23,000

to $50,000. Tr. pp. 498114-502117;

123. Mr. Naylor testiﬁed that his estimate for the repairs
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was not a

set

D Exs. pp.

t0

119-

ﬁgure but ranged from

$69,000 t0 $149,000, or a range of $80,000. Tr.

why

a separate report from his

his report

trail

going

down the same

502:18-25.

same ofﬁce came up With a

and preliminary cost estimate was

to its natural vegetative state,

p.

detailed explanation

drastically different result.

t0 return the road that

Naylor testiﬁed that there was

location

N0

Where Van Orden made

it

was only a cow

also testiﬁed that parts 0f his report identiﬁed items that

repaired but he did not

5 1 8: 1 8-519:

1.

know Whether it was

There was n0 evidence

Although

was improved by Van Orden

at least

a cattle

trail if

not an

ATV

his cut With his bulldozer. Tr. p.

51528-24. Again, his report actually calls the road leading t0 the cut

wheel-drive road” before he testiﬁed that

was given

trail.

made by Van Orden

P Exs.

p.

a “4-

30 and 3 1. Naylor

would only “possibly” need

t0

be

probable that repairs were actually needed. Tr. pp.

elicited

about which parts 0f Naylor’s report established

possible repairs as opposed t0 probable repairs.

On redirect,
estimate

Plaintiffs’

was not reasonably

Tr. pp. 524:24-525:19.

counsel attempted t0 rehabilitate Mr. Naylor’s testimony that his

certain

and gave Mr. Naylor an opportunity

t0 explain his opinion.

Naylor then explained:

A. Yes. It seems that the term used by Mr. Cooper has some legal connotation
Which was — since I'm not certain what that means, it's difﬁcult for me to give an
accurate answer. If there's a deﬁnition of What that means, I don't know. I wanted
to clarify that cost estimates and cost opinions are quite typically done at different
scales. So there's -- and often they're designated by class, from Class 1, which is a
very precise cost estimate up to Class 5, which is -- it's a little better than arm
waiving. This is more like -- 0n the order 0f what I would call a Class 4 cost
estimate.

Tr. pp. 524:24-525:15. Thus,

that

Mr. Naylor testiﬁed that there are ﬁve classes of cost estimates and

he only provided a Class 4 cost estimate which

is

one step above “arm waiving.”

N0

evidence was ever presented and n0 legal authority was ever cited that “reasonable certainty” has

any unique meaning when used
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t0 describe

an expert’s opinion 0r that Mr. Naylor did not

understand the plain meaning of reasonable certainty

When he

testiﬁed that his opinions were not

reasonably certain.
Eventually, the motion to strike

was denied because

the

trial

merely used the language 0f the cross—examining attorney and the
opinion testimony was

court found that the expert

trial

court determined that the

relevant but never determined that Mr. Naylor established his

still

opinions to a reasonable degree 0f certainty. Tr. pp. 690: 16-691 :6.

When Van Orden
existing road, he also

road.

Van Orden

made

a cut 0n

repaired the

Van Orden followed
Van Orden

used his bulldozer and made the cut 0n the Thompson land 0n the

IDL

IDL

land he was leasing that was not part 0f an existing

land at a cost of approximately $530. Tr. pp. 792220—798z23.

a remediation plan devised

testiﬁed that he could

land. Tr. pp. 792:20-798223.

make

the

by IDL.

same

Tr. pp. 792220-798223;

D

EXS. 86-89.

repairs t0 Radford’s land as he did t0 the

IDL

That testimony was never disputed.

N0

evidence that Respondent’s and Seven J’s property were enclosed by a single
fence

At
that the

trial,

there

was extensive testimony about fences

Homer Basin pasture was surrounded by a

by Seven

J lies within the

outside of that pasture. There

lies

Homer Basin

area and even

However, none of the property owned

Homer Basin pasture. As can be

majority of the Seven J property

Ridge pasture or that a

fence.

in the

seen from Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 57, the

Within the Outlet Ridge pasture although some of it extends

was no testimony

at trial

single, lawful fence enclosed

about any fence surrounding the Outlet

both the Radford and Seven J properties.

There was n0 testimony that any fences in the Outlet Ridge pasture are considered “legal”
fences.
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Notice t0 Seven J regarding the obligation t0 construct a fence

Mark Radford testiﬁed that he brought the claim
Seven

Code

J in

against Seven J after sending notice to

October 2017 that he was going t0 build his half 0f a partition fence pursuant t0 Idaho

section 35-103. Tr. pp.193:16-194: 10. Radford identiﬁed Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 53 as the

notice letter that

was

sent to

Todd and Joey Christiansen

336: 15-338:5. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 53
representatives of Seven

J.

is

However,

as representatives 0f

a letter dated October 17, 2017 and

it

was

also sent to

is

Seven

addressed to

IDL and Van Orden and

speciﬁcally

addressed the partition fences that Radford wanted built between property Radford
controlled and

IDL

land. P. EXS. 67-97.

states that a “separate

Exhibit 53

to

Seven

Tr. pp.

is

the only notice t0 Seven J that

that

is

he does not

in the record.

know

t0

Seven

There

is

[J]

owned

letter,

or

clearly

as well.” Tr. p. 36225-1

1.

n0 proof 0f any prior notice

if a separate notice

was ever

sent t0

Seven

J.

63 1 14-362:16.
:

II.

1.

seven 0f the October 17, 2017

and more detailed notice will be sent

Radford testiﬁed

J.

On page

Tr. pp.

J.

Whether the

ISSUES

district court erred in

claim against Jay

determining the Respondents had standing to bring a

damage to property When the Respondents did not own
damage occurred and pursued their claim based on an

Van Orden

the property at the time the

ON APPEAL

for

assignment from the prior property owner.
2.

Whether the district court erred in awarding damages for property damage when the
damages were based on testimony from an expert that testiﬁed that his opinions on
damages calculations were not offered to a reasonable degree 0f certainty in his ﬁeld and
where he stated that his calculations 0f damages were just a step above a guess.

3.

Whether

there

was sufﬁcient evidence

single, legal fence that warranted requiring Seven J t0 pay for
under Idaho Code section 35-103.

4.

Whether the

trial

were enclosed by a
half of a partition fence

that the parties’ properties

court erred in awarding

damages

for a fence that

was paid

in part

by

Radford Cattle, LLC when Radford Cattle does not have a valid claim against Seven J
because it did not own the property adj acent t0 the Seven J property and there is no
evidence Mark Radford ever had t0 pay the amount invoiced t0 Radford Cattle, LLC.
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Whether

5.

When

was sufﬁcient notice to Seven J as required by Idaho Code section 35-103
was sent stated that separate more detailed notice would be sent t0
Ranches, Inc. but there is n0 evidence that any such notice was sent.
there

a letter that

Seven

J.

judge abused his discretion in determining that Respondent was the
prevailing party and that the fees awarded were reasonable.

Whether the

6.

district

III.

ARGUMENT

A. Standard 0f Review

The standard 0f review

on appeal one through ﬁve

for issues

is

described in Akers

v.

Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 43—44, 205 P.3d 1175, 1179—80 (2009):

Review 0f a

trial court's

decision

supports the ﬁndings of

conclusions of law. Since

limited t0 ascertaining Whether the evidence

and Whether the ﬁndings of

fact,
it is

is

the province of the trial court t0

fact

support the

weigh conﬂicting

evidence and testimony and t0 judge the credibility 0f the witnesses, this Court
will liberally construe the trial court's ﬁndings 0f fact in favor of the
entered.

A trial

court's

ﬁndings 0f

fact will not

be

ﬁndings are clearly erroneous. If the ﬁndings 0f
evidence, even if the evidence

is

The ﬁndings of

aside

When based upon

the

trial

its

View 0f the

facts for that

court 0n the question 0f

substantial

0n appeal unless the

based upon substantial

conﬂicting, they will not be overturned 0n

appeal. This Court will not substitute
court.

set aside

fact are

judgment

damages

0f the

trial

Will not be set

and competent evidence.

(citations omitted).

The standard of review on
for

the sixth issue dealing with attorney fees and costs

an abuse of discretion. Lettunich

B.

The

trial

not the

v.

is

reviewed

Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749, 185 P.3d 258, 261 (2008)

court erred in holding that Respondents had standing because they were
owners of the subject property When the damage occurred and the

title

Thompsons did not

suffer

any damages s0 there was not a valid claim they could

assign t0 the Respondents.

The

ﬁrst issue

0n appeal

relates t0 the

road that Jay

Van Orden improved 0n property that

Radford purchased from the Thompson family in 2017. The road was cut With a bulldozer While
Jay was working on fences in the area in the summer 0f 2016. Radford did not purchase the
property until January 20 1 7, after
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Van Orden had

already cut the road. Radford claimed that

Van

Orden’s conduct was a trespass that interfered with his property
the Respondents could recover in a claim for trespass against

Respondents did not
court held that

own the property when the

The

rights.

trial

court found that

Van Orden even though

trespass occurred. R. pp. 335-336.

was possible because Shirley Thompson assigned any claims

the

The

trial

Thompson

family had to the Respondents. R. pp. 335-336.

There are several reasons

why the

pursue the assigned claims. The ﬁrst

Thompson

the

court erred in holding that Respondents could

based 0n the agreement between Radford and Shirley

for the purchase 0f the property. Defendants’ Exhibit 13

and Sale Agreement
identiﬁes

is

trial

Mark Radford

Agreement

Mark Radford

that

as the buyer

states that

states starting at line

2:

Thompson property.

signed for the purchase of the

and does not mention Radford

Radford chose

110 0n page

the Real Estate Purchase

is

Cattle,

t0 inspect the property before

“BUYER’S

LLC

at all.

he purchased

it.

It

Page 2 of
It

then

acceptance 0f the condition 0f the

PROPERTY is a contingency 0f this Agreement.” (emphasis in original). Radford was
Thompson of any deﬁciencies

required t0 give written notice to Shirley
required repair.

The Agreement

notice 0f deﬁciencies, the

correct.” In response t0 this

on page

is.”

This

is

page 2

Buyer assumes

corrections other than for items

property “as

states at

Which

line

116 that

by

Buyer does not give written

“all liability, responsibility

SELLER has

and expense for repairs or

otherwise agreed in writing to repair or

Agreement, Radford testiﬁed

reinforced

if the

in the property that

the terms 0f the

at trial that

Agreement

he bought the subject

as stated in the last

two

2:

If

BUYER

does not give written notice of cancellation Within the

periods speciﬁed,

BUYER

shall conclusively

be deemed

t0

strict

time

have elected

t0

proceed With the transaction Without repairs 0r corrections other than for items

which

SELLER has
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otherwise agreed in writing t0 repair 0r correct.

lines

Radford bought the property without giving any written notice that the subj ect road

Orden cut needed

was

be repaired. Van Orden cut the road

t0

in existence before

purchase of the

When the

in the

summer of 2016. Thus,

Radford purchased the property. According

to the

Agreement

Thompson property, Radford purchased the property in the

sale closed

and he assumed

all liability,

responsibility

that

condition

and expense

Van

the road

for the

it

existed

for repairs t0 the

property.

The

court held that

trial

Agreement.

Tr. p. 11.

Van Orden

could not enforce the Real Estate Purchase

However, Van Orden was not attempting

t0 enforce the

Agreement

between Radford and Shirley Thompson. Instead, Van Orden was establishing

Thompson and the Ted Thompson

estate

had nothing

t0 assign.

that Shirley

The Idaho Supreme Court has

stated:

As

a general rule, the assignment 0f a claim 0r a chose in action Without any

indication 0f an intention

with

all

by

the parties to restrict

the rights and remedies possessed

by

its

operation vests the assignee

0r available t0 the assignor, except

those that are personal to the assignor and for his or her beneﬁt only

assignment, there

is

a complete divestment of

all rights

In an

from the assignor and a

vesting of those rights in the assignee.

JBM,

LLC

v.

Cintorino, 159 Idaho 772, 776, 367 P.3d 167, 171 (2016). However, the

assignee only aquires the rights 0f the assignor. Id. Thus, if the assignor could not pursue

a claim, the assignee cannot pursue the same claim. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) 0f
Contracts § 336(1) (1981)); Jones

v.

Stoddart, 8 Idaho 210, 67 P. 650, 652 (1902) (“He

stands in that respect in the shoes 0f his assignor.”). “[A]n assignee takes the subject 0f

the assignment With all

assignor.” Foley

v.

the

rights

and remedies possessed by and available

t0

the

Grigg, 144 Idaho 530, 533, 164 P.3d 810, 813 (2007) (emphasis in

original). In this case, the assignor is Shirley

representative 0f the

Ted Thompson
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estate.

Thompson

herself and as the personal

However, the Thompsons did not

suffer

any

damages. The purchase price of the property sold to Radford was not affected because 0f

Van Orden’s

conduct. Radford never sued the

Thompsons and based 0n

the terms of the

Purchase and Sale Agreement he could not have because he did not provide written
notice as required and he purchased the property “as is” after the road had already been

cut

by Van Orden. The Thompsons never paid anything

for the

damage

suffer

Hill,

title

it.

Thus,

if the

to the real estate at the

itself requires the

party claiming

time 0f the injury to the real property. Mueller

v.

158 Idaho 208, 213, 345 P.3d 998, 1003 (2015). The Court ruled 0n summary judgment that

Radford had standing
Shirley

C0.,

compensate him

assigned and then pursued by Radford.

Furthermore, a trespass that causes injury to the land
injury t0 have legal

t0

any damages because 0f Van Orden’s conduct, there was not a

Van Orden that could be

valid claim against

Radford

he purchased

to the property that occurred before

Thompsons did not

t0

to bring the trespass claim

Thompson. The Court

relied

because of an assignment of the claim by
v.

Boise Fayette Lumber

in holding that there could

be an assignment of a

0n Idaho Gold Dredging Corp.

54 Idaho 765, 37 P.2d 407, 409 (1934)

trespass claim. In that case, the Idaho

Supreme Court held

that Idaho

Code

section 55-402

applied and allowed an existing cause 0f action in an ongoing lawsuit t0 be assigned t0 another

party.

However,

that case does not address the issue

that case involved a trespass. In fact the

in the related case

word

Supreme Court. In

trespass never appears in that case.

of as Idaho Gold Dredging Corp.

22 P.2d 147, 151 (1933), which contains the
the earlier case, the Idaho

0f trespass or Whether the circumstances in

v.

does appear

Boise Fayette Lumber C0., 52 Idaho 766,

fact pattern

and

initial

ﬁndings of the Idaho

Supreme Court references

the statute 0f limitations

that applies t0 trespass, but the Idaho

Supreme Court speciﬁcally held

limitations did not apply in that case.

These cases were not dealing with a

Appellant’s Brief - Page 13

It

that the trespass statute

0f

trespass. In fact, Idaho

Code

section 55-402 that the court in the Idaho

statute.

Gold cases

relied

on

is

a personal property

Chapter 4 of Title 55 deals speciﬁcally With personal property and not With rights

regarding real property.

Furthermore, t0 the extent that the Idaho Gold cases d0 apply to real property, they were
clearly overturned

by the Mueller

case.

The Idaho Supreme Court

in

Mueller analyzed trespass

claims in detail and held that in order to pursue a trespass claim for damage to real property, a
party must have been the

title

owner When

address the Idaho Gold cases 0r Idaho

the

Code

damage

occurred.

The Mueller court did not

section 55-402 directly. But, t0 the extent those

could have applied t0 a trespass claim, they have been overruled by Mueller because “[O]ne

having no legal

damaged by the

title

t0 real estate, either in whole, or a reversionary interest therein, cannot

be

destruction 0f buildings 0r trees, 0r any 0f the appurtenances thereon 0r there-

unto belonging, because he has n0 interest in the land.” Mueller, 158 Idaho

at

215, 345 P.3d at

1005.

Section 55-402 does allow a “thing in action” t0 be assigned, but that

is

not applicable in

this case.

The Thompsons never ﬁled a lawsuit or a claim against Jay Van Orden, so

n0 “thing

in action” that could

No

at trial

but Plaintiffs never offered the

evidence of a valid assignment was presented

were not given the opportunity to renew

their obj ections to the alleged

raised in Defendant’s closing arguments. R. pp. 297-300.
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was

be assigned by Shirley Thompson t0 Radford.

This issue would have been raised again

assignment as an exhibit.

there

at trial.

Defendants

assignment but

it

was

C.

Damages

for the cut

made by Jay Van Orden should

not be awarded because

Respondent’s expert testiﬁed that his opinions were only preliminary opinions and
that they were not reasonably certain.
Furthermore, the damage calculations offered by Plaintiffs’ expert are purely speculative

and cannot sustain the award 0f $72,175 as determined by the

trial court.

Mark Radford

presented testimony from Patrick Naylor as t0 his preliminary opinions 0n the cost t0 repair the

road that Jay

cut. Plaintiffs’

Exhibit 22

is

Mr. Naylor’s

report.

The Naylor report describes

his

opinions 0n damages as being a “preliminary opinion 0n construction costs.” P’s EX. 22 at p

He even testiﬁed that his

report

is

not a bid for actual repair costs because

be a bid and that his preliminary opinion

a class four opinion, which

is

speculation. Mr. Naylor artiﬁcially increased

The page 0f his

report that

is

Bates stamped

damages two times

is

it is

too speculative t0

just a step

above a pure

after calculating the total cost.

MRADFORD000021

shows

that the total cost as

being $76,175. That amount was then increased by a contingency of 30% t0 bring the
$99,028. The explanation given

by Naylor

is

his preliminary opinion.

He

testiﬁed that he

he added the ﬁrst contingency.
report.

He

increase

He

total to

that a detailed design for the remediation

not been prepared so he artiﬁcially inﬂated the cost in the event

was uncertain

5.

it

cost

more than

work had

anticipated in

as t0 the total actual cost t0 repair so

then adds another cost range contingency 0n page 5 of the

claims the cost could range from -30%, Which would be $69,000, but could also

50% t0

$149,000. Thus there

is

a range 0f $80,000 in the possible

damage amounts

in

Naylor’s preliminary opinion.

Adding

t0 the speculative nature

0f the opinion

is

that this

prepared by Mr. Naylor’s ofﬁce regarding the cost t0 repair the
contains another report that estimates the costs t0 repair the

t0 $50,000.

Naylor testiﬁed that his ofﬁce
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initially

was not

cut.

the ﬁrst report

Defendants’ Exhibit 30

same road

as ranging

from $23,000

proposed repairing the property and

preventing further erosion but that Radford
condition.3 Thus, this ﬁrst opinion

rej ected that

0n the cost

t0 repair

and wanted

was

rej ected

it

restored to

its

pristine

and Naylor was directed

t0

prepare one that included more repairs and items of damage. However, Naylor never ﬁnalized
his opinions

there

is

and testiﬁed

that

even his report only contained his “preliminary opinions.” Thus

range 0f $126,000 in possible damages calculated by Plaintiffs experts that goes from a

10w of $23,000

to a

high of $149,000.

“Damage awards based upon
Grp. ofCompanieS, Inc.

v.

Providence Washington

682 (1999). Patrick Naylor testiﬁed
calculations.

On redirect,

Plaintiffs’

about the certainty 0f his opinions.
different scales that

speculation and conj ecture will not be allowed.” Inland

that

133 Idaho 249, 257, 985 P.2d 674,

Ins. C0.,

he was not reasonably certain as t0 his damage

counsel attempted t0 rehabilitate Mr. Naylor.

He

He

asked

testiﬁed that cost estimates and opinions are done at

go from a Class Ito a Class V. Naylor testiﬁed

be a precise estimate.

He was

said that a Class

that a Class

I

estimate

would

V estimate would be little better than arm waiving. He

then testiﬁed that he considered his opinion in this case t0 be a Class IV estimate or a very
speculative estimate.

this type

The

speculative nature

is

not due to any inherent difﬁculty in calculating

0f cost. Naylor testiﬁed that he was only retained t0 provide a preliminary cost opinion

and not a more precise bid for what
expert himself testiﬁed that the

speculative if he

would

damage

had been asked

3

it

to

d0 a

actually cost t0

make

calculations could have

the suggested repairs.

been signiﬁcantly

The

less

class I 0r II estimate.

However, this would have been inappropriate because the evidence from Jay Van Orden and Patrick Naylor is that
is an existing 4 wheel drive road 0r ATV trail that leads t0 the cut. The area was not pristine before the cut was
made. The proposed cost estimate seeks to restore the cut to a condition it was never in before. Radford testiﬁed that
he intends to use the property to graze cattle. The cut in the road does not impede or injure his ability to graze cattle.
It actually allows better access to the outlet and t0 repair fences.
there
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The
that

trial

court denied a motion t0 strike Naylor’s testimony.

The

trial

court determined

Naylor was merely using the language of defense counsel. However, the testimony from

Naylor

is clear:

Q.

You

indicate that this opinion does not represent a bid.

A. Yes.

Q.

What do you mean by that?

A.

A bid would require a detailed design in order to have a more precise

assessment of cost and

Q. So

activities.

one were t0 develop a reasonably certain amount, that would be a

if

bid?
A. Yes.

Q.

And yours

A. That

is

not reasonably certain because

it's

not a bid, correct?

is correct.

Tr. p. 495:1 1-22. This

testimony does not require a unique understanding 0f the phrase

“reasonably certain.” This phrase does not have a unique meaning in the law that

comprehension 0f an expert making opinions on

costs.

“Compensatory damages

the facts permit.

(2007).

.

..”

Grijﬁth

v.

have

that his preliminary opinion

we would have prepared

stated in the

be proved with whatever deﬁniteness and accuracy

establishes that his opinion

and could have been much more precise
is

is

Clear Lakes Trout C0., 143 Idaho 733, 741, 152 P.3d 604, 612

The testimony from Naylor

testimony

t0

beyond the

Mr. Naylor speciﬁcally explained that his

opinions were preliminary opinions and that they did not constitute a bid. This
report.

is

if he

was only a preliminary opinion

would have prepared an

was not reasonably

certain

actual bid.

and

that

it

The

expert’s

could have been

if

a bid. Thus, damages in this case are speculative and should not have

been awarded.
There

is

by Mr. Radford

further testimony that

are in this case. Jay

area where he cut the road on the

IDL

shows just how speculative the damage amounts proposed

Van Orden testiﬁed that he damaged IDL

Thompson property. Van Orden

land in the same

testiﬁed that the

damage

t0 the

land was approximately the same size and type 0f damage as his cut t0 the subject road. The
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IDL

inspected the

damage

Defendants’ Exhibit 10.

hand

t0

IDOL land and directed Jay to repair the damage

Van Orden was

as is explained in

some

required t0 spread seed, pull back

soil piles

With

and then use herbicide as needed. Jay spent approximately $400 on seed and then he

tools,

used a rake

t0

smooth out the

soil.

He

has not been required to apply an herbicide but if he

is

required to d0 so, he Will need a gallon of 2,4-D that costs about $30 and a back—pack style
sprayer that costs $100. Jay testiﬁed that he

on Radford’s property and

damage

t0

that

it

might take him a day

IDL property in the same

considered.

It is

would be Willing

t0

do the same remediation work

t0 complete. Thus,

area for approximately $1000

unreasonable to say that damage 0n

IDL

Jay repaired similar

When time and

labor are

land can be reasonably repaired for

approximately a thousand dollars while property located a few hundred yards away 0n Radford’s
property requires somewhere between $69,000 and $149,000 t0 remediate.

Again, the estimate and proposed work are not in line with restoring the cut to the
preexisting ATV/two-track road. For example, Naylor testiﬁed that there

in the area in places not cut

little

by Jay Van Orden. His

erosion in the two years since the cut

Naylor’s preliminary cost opinion

is

no evidence

that the top soil

is t0

In fact

IDL

IDL

did not require

was made. However,

are really just about inﬂating the

little

top soil

had been very

the single largest item in

truck in 12 inches 0f topsoil for a cost 0f $33,000. There

soil in the area

Van Orden to bring

land. Tr. pp. 590:17-59lz4.

to stop erosion. In fact,

around the cut was shallow.

Tr. p. 5 1 6: 16-19.

in top soil t0 repair the similar cut

he made 0n

There are similar problems with most 0f the cost line items that

damages and not

the ATV/two-track road before Jay
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report also states that there

was necessary t0 regrow vegetation or

Naylor himself testiﬁed that the top

was very

improved

it.

truly evaluating

what

it

would take

t0 restore

If damages are

property before
precise

it

numbers

awarded against Jay Van Orden

for the road

he cut on the Thompson

was purchased by Radford, those damages should be

that Jay

Van Orden was

similar repairs to property in the

same

consistent with the

able t0 provide from his ﬁrst-hand experience

area.

making

The damages should not be awarded based 0n

Naylor’s “preliminary” opinion that he testiﬁed was not reasonably certain and was just one step

above throwing your arms up in the

air.

D. Plaintiffs did not meet their burden t0 establish that all requirements 0f Idaho Code
section 35-103 because there was no evidence introduced that Radford and Seven J
properties were enclosed by one fence.

Idaho Codes section 35-103 permits a landowner that provides proper notice t0 an
adj oining

landowner

to recover the cost

0f erecting half 0f the fence between the respective

parcels 0f land if the parcels 0f land are enclosed

by a

single, lawful fence. In fact

prerequisite 0f this statute that the adjoining parcels 0f land be enclosed

Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 406, 195 P.3d 1212, 1219 (2008).

N0

by “one

There are fences in the

area, as

met the

J property

and

it is

Plaintiffs did not offer

any evidence

Plaintiff’s Exhibit

that the fence

The only testimony about fences was about

The Idaho Supreme Court has upheld a
“not apply”

enclosed by a

46 which does

a series 0f different fences that g0 around property

statutory requirements for a lawful fence or that

properties.

at trial to

are existing fences in the area but those fences do not completely enclose the

Radford and Seven

by third-parties.

J are

v.

noted by the Court in the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions 0f Law. However, the Court relied only on

show that there

a

fence.” Porter

evidence was presented

show that the property owned by Radford and the property owned by Seven
single, lawful fence.

it is

when

there
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is

n0 evidence

trial

it

owned

around the Outlet Ridge Unit

enclosed the Radford and Seven J

the fence around the

court decision that Idaho

Code

Homer Basin Unit.
section 35-103 does

that the fence surrounding the properties in question is a

“lawful fence.” Porter, 146 Idaho at 406, 195 P.3d at 1219.

burden and an award 0f $5,000 was not supported by the
in

assuming

E.

it

also erred in awarding

distinction

damage

court erred

property.

J properties.

D EXS. p.

It is

interest in the property

it

Radford

Seven

was Radford

n0 evidence

n0 evidence

J portion

Cattle,

LLC

the buyer of the

in the record that

Thompson

Radford Cattle had any legal

Exhibit 91-A are the invoices submitted for the

0f the partition fence. The ﬁrst invoice in that Exhibit

Mark Radford was

ever required t0 pay that amount back to

Radford Cattle could not make a Claim under Idaho Code 35-103 because

own any of the

land involved in this case.

Radford Cattle any damages in relation
for the costs incurred

As

such,

t0 the fence

and paid for by Radford
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for

Cattle that incurred $1,255 of the cost of constructing the fence. There

in the record that

Cattle.

Mark Radford was

owned by Mark Radford.

cost 0f constructing the

that

is

Mark Radford and Radford

$5,000 for the fence constructed between the Radford

undisputed that

108-1 14. There

to

between Mark Radford individually and Radford

LLC when it awarded Respondents

and Seven

not

trial

their

incurred in constructing the fence.

The Court made n0

the fence.

is

and the law. The

meet

The Court erred in awarding $1,255 0f the $5,000 awarded t0 Respondents as that
amount was incurred by Radford Cattle, LLC Who did not own the property
adjacent t0 Seven J and thus had n0 right t0 require Seven J t0 reimburse it for the

The Court

shows

facts

such, Plaintiffs did not

facts that are not in the record.

expenses

Cattle,

As

it

and

Cattle.

was an

it

error

by the

trial

it

did

court to award

should not have awarded any damages

The Court erred

determining that there had been proper notice t0 Seven J as the
Respondents represented in the letter t0 Seven J that a separate and more detailed
notice would be sent t0 Seven J.

F.

in

Radford claims that Seven
constructed between property
3 5- 1 O3.

J.

Ranches

is

owned by Seven

liable for half the cost

of a fence that was

Ranches and Radford pursuant

J.

to I.C. section

That statute provides:

When two

more persons own land adjoining which is inclosed by one (1)
becomes necessary for the protection 0f the rights and interests 0f
one (1) party that a partition fence be made between them, the other or others,
when notiﬁed, must proceed to erect, or cause to be erected, one—half ( 1/2 ) 0f such
and

fence,

0r

it

partition fence; said fence t0

And

said land.

be erected 0n, 0r as near as practicable t0, the line 0f
given in writing, either party fails t0 erect and

after notice

if,

complete, within six (6) months time thereafter, one-half ( 1/2 ) of such fence, the
party giving the notice may proceed t0 erect the entire partition fence and collect

by law one-half the costs of such fence from
upon the land thus partitioned.
The obligation
written notice

This

is

for

was

Seven

Ranches

received.

to construct half 0f the

The only notice

that is part

boundary fence only

0f the record

came from
t0 the

a

May 3,

October

17,

Seven

J.

Page seven 0f that

2017

letter

2017

letter.

from IDL

to Jay.

However, the

IDL ground and ground that Radford

letter

either

That

May 3,

owns

May 3,
2017

2017

letter

17,

2017

letter

notice will be sent t0 Seven

more

detailed notice

from Radford’s counsel then
[J]

was ever
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as well.”

sent.

P EXS

Gary Cooper and

letter is

J.

Ranches

attached as Exhibit

only addressed fences between

or leases. There are no references t0 fences 0r

would not address fencing between Radford and Seven

The October

Exhibit 53.

claims that the notice t0 Seven

requirements to fence between Seven J and Radford properties.
lessee

arises after

is Plaintiffs’

a letter dated October 17, 2017, from Radford’s attorney t0 the IDL,

representatives from

C

J.

the other party, and he has a lien

A letter from the IDL to its

J that does not involve

states that

73. There is

“A

no evidence

separate,

IDL

more

at all.

detailed

that this separate

Radford had n0 recollection of a separate notice being

and
sent.

“The doctrine 0f quasi estoppel prevents a party from asserting a
another party, Which

is

inconsistent With a position previously taken.”

right, t0 the

Atwood v.

detriment 0f

Smith, 143

Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 310, 3 14 (2006) (citation and quotation omitted). Assuming that Idaho

Code 35-103 applied

in this case,

Radford had a right

t0 collect the cost

0f the partition fence that Seven J was responsible for constructing

However, Radford represented
to

Seven

letter

to

J.

was

Seven

J

At

trial,

to

Seven

J that additional

who

Code

and more detailed notice

to maintain a position different

leaves Seven J without a

from what he had

way to

determine

arrived.

the fence especially with the representation that there

it

It is

as to

Where the fences

constructed ofﬂine as Radford proposed in

Seven

2017

would be more

details.

in

J properties.

be erected, especially

Homer Basin.

would not

J

because

running t0 construct

away from any boundary line

are going to

17,

start

unconscionable t0 permit Radford

starts

away from any boundary line between IDL and Seven

communicate

October

portion of the fence

46 where Radford completed portions 0f the fence

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit

on

its

his lawyers represent t0

when the time

already constructed one of his boundary fences

that the

section 35-103. This caused a disadvantage

could anticipate that the time to construct

t0 run until the separate

after receiving notice.

and more speciﬁc notice would be sent

Radford changed his position and represented

the only notice required under Idaho

0f constructing the half

its

it

half of

Radford had
as

can be seen in

pink with the number 4

The

if

parties

need

to

fences are going to

Tr. pp. 262220-264zl9. Thus, there

was

not proper notice and the doctrine 0f quasi estoppel prevents Respondents from claiming that the

October

17,

2017

letter
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satisﬁed the notice requirement.

G. The

court abused

trial

its

discretion in

Plaintiffs are not the prevailing

1.

against Seven J

is

Court ﬁnds that the

If this

awarding attorney
party

when

awarding fees

is

the entirety 0f the litigation

considered.

trial

court erred 0n in ﬁnding that Idaho

or that proper notice had been given and the award of $5,000
fees should also be vacated

fees

and the analysis 0f Whether the

Code 35-103 applied

vacated, then award of attorney

is

court abuse

trial

its

discretion in

not necessary.

Respondents only pursued costs and fees against Seven
prevailed 0n the only cause of action against Seven

J.

That

is

J

and represented

that they

not accurate. The Respondents ﬁled

a Motion in Limine t0 have the Court decide an “unresolved issue” and asked that the

hold that Seven

J.

Ranches,

motion was opposed
Tr. pp.

that the

Inc.

in part

was a general partnership under Idaho Law.

0n the basis

that

it

was not a cause 0f action

45-5 1. The Court held from the bench during

motion was not precluded on

evidence of that during

trial.

Tr. pp.

trial that it

that basis but that

35 1 221-352z2. The

Limine 0r rule in favor 0f Plaintiffs by ﬁnding

that

was

Tr. pp.

Seven

J

court

45-5 1. That

raised in the Complaint.

raised in the Complaint and

Respondents would have
trial

trial

t0 put

court did not grant that

0n

Motion

was a general partnership

in

in the

Finding of Facts and Conclusions 0f Law. Thus, Seven J prevailed 0n that issue. That was an
issue that

was a maj or concern

for the

owners of Seven

J

because

if the entity

would have been

held to be a general partnership instead of a corporation, the individual owners could have been
held individually

liable.

The

trial

court did not give this issue

in the course

0f litigation and was not part 0f the claim for

entertain the

motion and did not dismiss

to consider the

end

result

it

However, the

trial

for not being raised in the pleadings.

The

relief.

it

was made

court did

trial

court

is

of the entire course of litigation including issues and claims involved in

the action and not just those raised in the pleadings.
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much weight because

IRCP

54(d)(1)(B).

It is

abuse 0f discretion

to not give

any weight

to a

key issue

that

was briefed by the

signiﬁcant impact 0n the shareholder 0f Seven

J.

parties

and which would have had a

Thus, both parties prevailed in part and

it

was

an error to ﬁnd that Respondents were the prevailing party.

As

well,

Radford and Radford

Cattle,

LLC were not awarded the

amount

full

requested in the Complaint 0r that Radford testiﬁed he was entitled t0 recover

that they

at trial. In the

Complaint, Plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to $5,505 to reimburse them for the fence they

had constructed. The

trial

court only awarded $5,000. That

a 9.17% reduction in the claimed

is

amount. Nothing in the demand for payment that was sent by
litigation

showed what fence had been constructed or that

performed 0n the half 0f the fence that Seven

J

R. pp. 391-93. Neither invoice attached t0 the
0r what fence

Cattle,

was

LLC. R.

that borders

actually constructed.

p. 392.

This

on the Seven

two parcels when

it

is

the invoices

own

Demand

indicates

full

for

work

actually

Radford Cattle was not

either parcel. Thus,

it

LLC

demand was

does not

was appropriate
did not

t0

Radford
land

between

defend against a

own and the

amount they requested. Thus, defending against

to

own the

entitled to build a fence

it

statute.

where the work was performed

ﬁrst invoice attached to the

claim by Radford Cattle for building a fence between parcels

were not awarded the

were

could be required to construct under the

a problem because Radford Cattle,

J property.

does not

The

counsel prior t0

Plaintiffs’

the claim

Plaintiffs

was

reasonable and Seven J prevailed in part.

As argued
even though there

Mark Radford’s
was

billed t0

above, the

is

trial

no evidence

court awarded fees t0 Radford Cattle,

that

and Mark Radford

to construct the fence

between

property and the Seven J property. The invoice for $1,255.00 of the fencing cost

and paid for by Radford

Mark Radford

Radford Cattle had any right

LLC

Cattle.

P EXS.

104. There

ever had to pay back that amount individually.
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is

n0 evidence

As Radford

in the record that

Cattle incurred the

expense but had n0 right t0 require Seven
Radford,

it

was an

error for the court t0

claim against Seven

Even

2.

award

compensate
fees t0

it

constructed for

Radford Cattle as

it

did not have a valid

are considered the prevailing party, they are not entitled t0
the costs and fees they identify in their Memorandum 0f Costs.

if Plaintiffs
all

Respondents requested $1,278.32

in costs

and $29,899

court reduced the attorney fees to $29,1 15.25. However,

considered in
attorney fees

detail,

is

it is

clear that the trial court

considered in

abused

its

in attorney fees. R. p. 441.

when the time

The

entries are

discretion because that

amount of

not reasonable.

Idaho Code section 12-1200) and
attorney fees.”

Mark

for a fence

it

J.

recover

trial

J to

When the

detail,

it is

IRCP 54 only permit the award 0f “reasonable

by Respondents and awarded by the

fees charged

clear that the fees that

were awarded and were unreasonable

trial

court are

were awarded are not reasonable. The

will be addressed

by reference

fees that

to the letter paragraphs as

they were identiﬁed in the Order that granted the award of fees. R. pp. 441—452. The billings
referenced are

all

contained in Exhibit

B

to the Stenquist Afﬁdavit. R. p. 394.

The amounts

identiﬁed in bold are the amounts that are unreasonable and should have been disallowed.

a.

J.

On

10/14/2017, Jon Stenquist billed 0.8 hours to draft a notice 0f intent to fence to Seven

“and Foster Land and Cattle.” This clearly demonstrates that the fee incurred was for work that

included a fence With Foster Land and Cattle, an entirely different notice and fence that does not
pertain t0 any claim against Seven J Ranches. Similarly

from Radford
t0 determine

that

he billed

at 0.3 that

how much time was

on

6/ 1 8/2018,

Jon Stenquist took a

included a status 0n the “Foster fence.”

there

is

n0 way

spent 0n the Seven J matter as compared to the Foster fence

matter, these fees should be disallowed. Instead the trial court merely split the
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As

call

award

in half

without any factual basis. Thus, the award was not based on reason but pure speculation.
1.1

On

10/16/2017, Lee Radford reviewed and edited the

10/14/2017. Jon Stenquist

each other’s

letters.

of the Foster notice

He

is

a partner at the

hour.

As

and not just a

letter

well, directing

these entries included

amount, which

is

work 0n

work on a case and there was n0
reasonable attorney fees.

title

Seven

secretarial

is

— Total

He then

work and should not be
work and not

the

trial

ﬁrm. This

is

court

he directed work on
billed at

legal work.

still

0.6 at

$300 per

Even though

awarded the

On

full

7/17/2018, Lee

an administrative task and

not legal

is

It is

not

$300 per hour.
title

report from his client and drafted correspondence

A title to property was never at issue in this case. A title report was not
is

no explanation Why a

title

report

claim against Seven J or What correspondence was drafted and
It is

states that

hours at $300 per hour.

1.2

at the

Stenquist reviewed a

report.

J.

description that Radford did any actual legal work.

— Total

offered in evidence and there

to the case.

by Jon Stenquist on

not reasonable t0 have partners editing

is

letters is administrative

Radford again billed for directing work

regarding that

letter t0

work on another unrelated case

not reasonable.

On 7/3 1/ 1 8

ﬁrm and it

letter drafted

also put addresses in the “letters” indicating that this also included review

the letters. Putting addresses in letters

was reviewed

as part 0f the

how that correspondence related

unreasonable to allow billings for services not related t0 the case against Seven J

without any factual support that
e.

Total

hours at $300 per hour.

b.

d.

-

it

was

related to the case.

Lee Radford billed 0.8 hours on 9/21/ 1 8

for

— Total

0.3

making arrangements

corresponding with opposing counsel regarding the mediation dates.
10/2/ 1 8 for a meeting With

take place on October

8,
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Mark Radford t0

hours at $300 per hour.
for mediation

He then billed

discuss the strategy for mediation.

1.1

and

hours 0n

A mediation did

2018. However, that mediation took place in the case against Jay

Van

Orden.

It

did not involve the claims against Seven

J.

The order consolidating

the

two cases was

not entered until October 19, 2018. These fees are for a mediation that did not involve Seven J at

all.

Thus, they are not reasonable fees. The

trial

court held the mediation included Seven J

because 0f arguments raised in the motion t0 consolidate and evidence that came in

However, there was never any evidence submitted
mediation. There

Seven

was n0

On

ﬁnding

basis for trial court’s

J counterclaim 0r defenses. 1.9

that the

Seven

was

Van Orden. The

require 1.5 hours to discuss

at all in the

0f

hours at $300 per hour.

about. There

is

when compared

to

is

no

much more complex and time consuming

Seven

issues involving

Mark Radford. There

nothing specifying that the meeting had

anything to d0 with the Seven J case as opposed t0 the
case against Jay

were raised

that the mediation included discussions

10/15/18 Jon Stenquist billed 1.5 hours to meet With

explanation 0f what the meeting

J issues

at trial.

J

were not complicated and would never

Radford’s ten causes 0f action against

Van

Orden.

These are an unreasonable fees that are not justiﬁed against Seven J — Total 1.5 hours at $300

per hour.
i.

On

10/ 13/1 8 Robert

Orden and Seven

J

Couch billed

is

hours t0 review the complaints and answers in

and then corresponded With Stenquist. There

time was spent on each case but
case that

1.1

it is

clear

from the entry

not related t0 the claims against Seven

J.

J.

As

same ﬁrm. This

is

essentially duplicating work.

at the

j.

On

10/1 8/ 1 8 Robert

it is

not reasonable t0

Couch billed
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It is

work was done on the Van Orden

bill for

— Total

0.5 hours t0 ﬁle the

does not require a lawyer to ﬁle a document.

n0 breakdown of how much

Nevertheless, the Court awarded the full

amount against Seven

well,

that

is

Van

communications between lawyers
1.1

hours at $260 per hour.

answer to the counterclaim. This

not reasonable to charge a lawyers hourly rate

document with the Court and

to ﬁle a

it

does not take 30 minutes t0 ﬁle a document in iCourt. —

Total 0.5 hours at $260 per hour.

There

k.

corporation.

is

On

serious duplication in the fees charged for researching a dissolved 0r forfeited

7/26/1 8,

Lee Radford spent

1.0 hours researching the “status

0f corporation

following forfeiture 0f corporate charter.” Stenquist then reviewed “forfeiture research and
dissolution issues”

0n 10/13/1 8

for 0.1 hours. Robert

Couch then conducted research 0n

dissolved or forfeited corporations on 10/10/ 1 8 for 1.8 hours and again 0n 10/1

1/ 1 8 for 0.8

hours

and billed $260 per hour. This same research was repeated by Mr. Couch but for $275 per hour

0n 3/5/19

for 3.8 hours,

worked on

the motion t0 quash

was spent 0n each
the

same

task. It is

for 3.9 hours,

and on 3/7/19 for 3.0 hours. Mr. Couch also

0n these dates and times but does not delineate how much time

unreasonable for three different attorneys t0 spend time researching

issue 0r reviewing each other’s research. Furthermore, the issue they

relates t0 the

prevail

on 3/6/19

on

claim that Seven J should be treated as a general partnership. The Plaintiffs did not

and

that issue

determined

this

it

would not be reasonable

was a complex

issue

t0

when awarding

award them

merely requires reading Idaho
14.4 hours 0f legal

work 0n an

Respondents closing

and 10.7 hours

at

briefs.

statute that

issue that

— Total

1.1

fees.

fees but determine

above When conducting the prevailing party analysis. The truth

q.

were researching

is

it

the law

governs corporations and

was never presented

The

it

trial

court

was a minor
is

issue

not complex.

It

certainly did not require

at trial 0r raised in the

hours at $300 per hour, 2.6 hours at $260per hour,

$275 per hour.

Signiﬁcant time was also spent by Plaintiffs’ counsel 0n the Motion t0 Quash the

subpoenas, Which was granted and Plaintiffs were not permitted t0 serve subpoenas 0n
individuals and

had

to

modify
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all

unnamed

of the subpoenas to limit the scope 0f the subpoenas. See Order

entered 0n 3/14/ 19 attached to Motion t0 Augment. Thus, Seven J prevailed on the motion t0

quash and

Plaintiffs

should not be allowed t0 recover 0n fees associated With that motion 0r the

preparation of the conforming subpoenas. Plaintiffs’ counsel spent the following time on the

motion

to quash:

— Review motion

Couch

4.7 hours at $275 per hour

Stenquist

0.8 hours at

Couch

1.1

at

$275 per hour — Review motion

to

quash draft

Couch

3.8 hours at

$275 per hour — Review motion

to

quash draft

Couch

3.9 hours at

$275 per hour — Review subpoenas and motion

Stenquist

0.6 hours at

$300 per hour — Review and revise opposition

3/7/19

Couch

3.0 hours at

$275 per hour — Revise opposition

3/7/ 1 9

Stenquist

1.2

Couch

2.5 hours at

2/26/ 19

to

quash and

subpoenas
2/26/ 19

motion

to

$300 per hour — Review subpoenas and review

quash

3/4/ 19

hours

opposition
3/5/ 19

opposition4
3/6/ 19
t0

quash
3/6/ 19

to

motion

quash

to

t0

motion

t0

quash

0n motion

t0

Hours

at

$300 per hour — Analyze and prepare brieﬁng

quash

$275 per
prepare for the hearing and review draft subpoenas
3/12/19
Couch
5.9 hours at $275 per
attend
prepare
prepare proposed
hearing,
argument,
quash,
2.2 hours at $275 per
Couch
3/ 1 3/19
revise subpoenas
3/ 1 1/19

It is

hour — Review motion t0 quash and
hour — Review briefs on motion to
order

hour — Review hearing minutes and

not reasonable t0 award attorney fees to the Respondents for

were deemed too broad by the Court and had
lawyers and the paralegal.
Plaintiffs lost.

As

well,

it is

They did not prevail 0n

to

be revised. The work

is

not reasonable to award fees for

that issue.

Of thelO9

work on subpoenas

that

often duplicated between

work on

a motion that

hours 0f billed fees that Plaintiffs

claim they are entitled to recover, 29.7 of those hours were spent 0n work related t0 subpoenas.

That

is

per se unreasonable in a claim for just over $5,000. The subpoenas were to nearly a dozen

non-parties.

4

They

initially

The underlined entries were

regarding

Plaintiff’s

wanted

subpoena unnamed spouses. Eventually, they only deposed

also argued to

claim that Seven
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t0

J

be unreasonable above because they included time on research

should be treated as a general partnership.

Todd, Joey, Jim and Louetta Christiansen and Shelli

used

Van

Orden.

and none 0f the deposed Witnesses were called

at trial

None of the

depositions were

to testify at trial other than Shelli

Orden. Plaintiffs never even performed a 30(b)(6) deposition of Seven

J.

— Total

Van

27.1 hours at

$275 per hour and 2.6 hours at $300 per hour.

On the

t.

at

3/27/19, 3/28/19, 3/29/19, 4/3/19, 4/4/19, Robert

$275 per hour

Christensen.

Code

As

to prepare for or take the depositions

stated above, these depositions

section 35-103,

the partition fence.

Which

is

become apparent when the
attached to the

the

Motion

t0

in Support

am only t0

at

minutes.

Todd was deposed the same

9:47

from 10:24-10:27

am 0n March 29,

am and the

was a 12 minute

t0 him.

conclude a minute later

must pay

for half 0f

actually spent preparing

is

considered.

The Depositions
is

are

attached t0

2019. There were three exhibits used,

A recess was taken at 9:43 am and

at 9:48.

depo concluded
4,

at 10:28.

it

Joey was only deposed for 39

day. His deposition started at 10:00 am.

Jim and Louetta were deposed 0n April

am.

J

Augment.

resumed

It

Seven

of Motion t0 Disallow Cost and Fees that

one of which was the subpoena that was sent

14 am.

d0 with any elements 0f Idaho

how much time was

actual time 0f the depositions

Memorandum

to

The unreasonableness 0f spending 18.4 hours 0n these depositions

Joey’s deposition started at 9:05

9:

had nothing

explains in detail

spent a total 0f 18.4 hours

of Todd, Joey, Jim and Louetta

the basis for the Plaintiffs claim that

Couch never

verses taking the depositions.

Couch

A recess was taken

Todd was only deposed

2019. Jim’s depo started

at

deposition. Louetta’s depo started at 9:15

9:02

for

25 minutes.

am and concluded at

am and concluded at 9: 17

A two minute deposition. A total 0f 78 minutes of deposition but Robert Couch billed

hours in order to take 78 minutes 0f depositions.

As

well, Jon Stenquist also billed 0.7 hours

4/3/ 19 to assist in the outline of the Christiansen depos. Thus, Stenquist spent
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18.4

0n

42 minutes helping

with the outlines for Jim’s and Louetta’s depositions that only took 14 minutes
It is

total t0

complete.

unreasonable to award attorney fees that are so disproportionate t0 the services that were

rendered and that offered no value to the case.

— Total

18.4 hours at $275 per

hour and

0.7

hours at $300 per hour.

Thus the Court erred

in granting 11 hours

of attorney fees

at

$300/hr, 4.2 hours 0f

attorney fees at $260 per hour and 56.2 hours of attorney fees at $275 per hour for a total of

$19,847 in unreasonable
3.

The Rule

fees.

54(e) factors establish that the

award 0f attorney

fees

was

unreasonable.

A. Time and Labor

Without a doubt, Respondents’ counsel billed a signiﬁcant amount for a claim for just
over $5,000. However, this was not justiﬁed by the nature of the case. Idaho Code section 35103 only requires a party t0 prove that adj oining parcels 0f land are enclosed by one fence,

it is

necessary for the protection of the rights of one party to erect a partition fence, and proper
written notice

was provided. The

trial

While there were other complicated
It is

court repeatedly states that this case

issues, the single claim against

Seven

was complicated.
J

was not complicated.

a simple claim based 0n a statute with few elements. Again, the numerous subpoenas and the

four depositions that were taken on this claim did not delve into these elements at
the time spent

on subpoenas and depositions was not warranted by

all.

Thus,

this case. It certainly

all

does not

warrant duplicated efforts by three separate attorneys.
B.

The Court

Novelty and Difﬁculty 0f the Question
states that the parties’ “unwillingness t0

work

together substantially increased

the complexity and novelty 0f each party’s litigation strategy.” R. p. 453. There

all in

the record that the parties did not
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work together

in the discovery

is

n0 evidence

phase 0r that any such

at

unwillingness increased the complexity and novelty of litigation strategy. That
factor that is t0 be considered.

The

factor

is

code section applies. Porter
well,

it is

v.

not even the

novelty and difﬁculty 0f the questions. The claim

against Seven J dealt with the application of Idaho

section that even has a short Idaho

is

Code

section 35-103. That

Supreme Court decision

that interprets

is

a simple code

when and how the

Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 406, 195 P.3d 1212, 1219 (2008).

As

not relevant to the analysis that the claim was opposed. If a question became novel and

difﬁcult just because a claim

was opposed by the other party,

consider but would always apply if a claim

this

was opposed. The

would not be a

trial

factor to

court’s reasoning

is

unfairly

punitive towards a party that offers a defense. Counsel for Respondents only spent 78 minutes

asking the owners 0f Seven J questions during their depositions. The depositions were not used
in the trial

and none 0f them were called as Witnesses

in the

trial.

C. Skill Requisite t0 Perform the Legal Services and Qualiﬁcations 0f the

Attorneys

The

trial

However, the

court determined that the Respondents’ attorneys have considerable

trial

court never addressed the requisite skill t0 perform the legal services.

pursue a claim under Idaho Code section 35-103 does not require signiﬁcant
are simple.

The code

section

is

to

skill.

It

certainly does not require

do the work, understand the

The elements

two partners and an associate

legal principles, or to present

argument

to the court.

Again, they spent a total 0f 78 minutes asking four different witnesses questions. That

complicated case.

It

does not require advanced legal

skills 0r

D. The Prevailing Charges for Similar

The hourly rates charged by
rates in

Bingham County,
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To

not complicated to understand or require any particular training

0r experience to understand or apply.

from a ﬁrm

skill.

Plaintiffs’

Idaho. This

is

is

not a

knowledge.

Work

counsel are signiﬁcantly higher than prevailing

especially true

when

the nature 0f the case

is

considered

as

was discussed above. In

fact,

Gary Cooper, Who has been practicing

Idaho, only billed $200 per hour for this case and J.D.

and has been licensed
with the defense

ﬁrm

prevailing rates in

to practice

law

in

40 years

Oborn Who graduated law school

in

in

2013

Idaho since then, only billed $175 per hour. Paralegals

only billed $100 per hour. These rates are

Bingham County and

for over

much more

in line with the

similar communities throughout south east Idaho.

E. Fixed Hourly Fees
This factor has no bearing in this case.

Time Limitations Imposed by the

F.

There were no unusual time limitations in

Client or Circumstances 0f the Case

this case that

made

it

exceptional 0r that

increased the difﬁculty 0r complexity 0f this case.

Amount Involved and the Results Obtained

G. The

Respondents incurred more than $30,000 in costs and fees in a case where they were only

awarded $5,000, Which

is less

than What was demanded prior t0

trial.

As

stated above, a portion

of the amount awarded against Seven J for the fence was an expense incurred by Radford

LLC, which did not own property

adjacent t0 Seven J and did not have a right t0 require Seven J

to build a fence or t0 recuperate the cost

The other 54(6)

When these

do not

of building any such partition fence.

really apply in this case

factors are considered, the

of a

statute to the facts

and

fees. First the

were improperly

factors

Cattle,

amounts billed

and will not be addressed.
for a case involving the application

of this case does not warrant an award of approximately $30,000 in costs

award of fees should be reduced by the hours and amount

billed as described above.

Any amount awarded

for the hours that

should be further reduced

because the hourly rate was too high and the number 0f hours billed was excessive for such a
simple case involving a claim for only $5,505 dollars.
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IV. Conclusion

Based on the forgoing the Appellants request

that the Idaho

Supreme Court hold

as

follows:

1.

The

determining the Respondents had standing to bring a claim against

district court erred in

Jay Van Orden for damage t0 property When the Respondents did not own the property at the
time the damage occurred and pursued their claim based 0n an assignment from the prior
property owner.

2.

The

awarding damages for property damage When the damages were

district court erred in

based on testimony from an expert that testiﬁed that his opinions on damages calculations
were preliminary opinions and were not offered t0 a reasonable degree 0f certainty in his
ﬁeld and where he stated that his calculations 0f damages were just a step above a guess.

3.

There was insufﬁcient evidence to ﬁnd that the Seven

J

and Radford properties were

enclosed by a single, legal fence that warranted requiring Seven J t0 pay for half 0f a
partition fence under Idaho Code section 35-103.
4.

The

trial

court erred in awarding

LLC when Radford Cattle

damages

for a fence that

5.

Seven J property and there
pay the amount invoiced t0 Radford Cattle, LLC.

by Radford

is

it

Cattle,

did not

own

no evidence Mark Radford ever had

There was not sufﬁcient notice to Seven J as required by Idaho Code section 35-103 when a
letter that was sent stated that separate more detailed notice would be sent to Seven J.
Ranches,

6.

in part

does not have a valid claim against Seven J because

the property adj acent to the
t0

was paid

The

Inc.

district

party and

but there

is

no evidence

that

any such notice was

sent.

judge abused his discretion in determining that Respondent was the prevailing

that the fees

awarded were reasonable.

Based on the above ﬁndings, the Idaho Supreme Court should vacate the judgment entered
against

Van Orden and Seven J Respondents

should not be awarded a monetary judgment against

either appellant.

DATED this

1“ day of May, 2020.

W
J.D.
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OBORN

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I

HEREBY CERTIFY that 0n the

1” day of May, 2020,

I

electronically ﬁled the

foregoing with the Clerk 0f the Court using the Idaho I-Court E-File system and requested that a

Notice of Filing be sent to the following persons:

Lee Radford
Jon A. Stenquist
Robert

J.

Couch

& Latimer
350 Memorial Drive, Suite 300
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
lradford@parsonsbehle.com

Parsons Behle

istenquist@parsonsbehle.com

rcouch@parsonsbehle.com

W
J.D.
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